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On 2 July 1923, Alfred Sloan – the famous CEO of General Motors – wrote 
to a distressed Mr. Kettering as follows: 
 
"It was called to my attention recently that there were 143 copper cooled 
cars out in the territory and it appeared to be desirable to withdraw them and 
reassemble them. In other words, it was thought desirable, in view of the fact 
that there were more or less complaints, not dealing with the engine particularly 
but dealing with the whole car, that they should be taken in and an adjustment 
made" (Sloan, 1963 p. 90). 
 
Charles Kettering had been head of research for General Motors since 1920 
and, also thanks to Alfred Sloan’s efforts, he would remain in that position until 
1947. However, at that time, Kettering was ready to resign. He believed that the 
copper-cooled car, which Kettering called the air-cooled car (and was later to be 
known by that name), was a major invention. It marked an improvement over 
water cooling systems because it avoided the problem of the water freezing in 
cold weather. Kettering, backed by Dupont, had pressed for the application of 
this technological innovation; but the results had been an outbreak of 
"technological accidents" at GM. However, it was not clear whether the 
breakdowns were due to the immaturity of Kettering's new device or, rather, to 
poor implementation of the innovation by the production divisions. 
 
In the same letter Alfred Sloan defended the procedures that had induced 
GM to halt production of copper-cooled cars, and in his memoirs he added: 
 
The copper-cooled car had failed to meet the test of validity. It had failed at 
Oakland. It had been adjudged as needing further development by a joint study 
made by the chief engineers of Buick, Chevrolet and Northway - a highly 
competent group. Sample cars produced by Chevrolet, and sent into the field                                                                    2 
had been withdrawn because of serious defects. The problem was complicated 
by the uncertainties of a new chassis as well as new engine. We had to 
recognize that research engineers had little experience, relatively speaking in 
chassis design as compared with engineering staffs of the operating divisions. I 
had of necessity to respect all these facts and circumstances. (Sloan, 1963 p. 89) 
  
Even if much of the literature has related the famous GM-Fisher Body 
integration to hold-up problems, we will argue that difficulties like those 
considered above can explain most of the reasons for this famous merger.  
  On the hold-up interpretation put forward by the New Property Rights 
approach (Hart 1995), the problem arose when GM wanted to expand its 
production facilities. Vertical integration, and in particular the acquisition of 
Fisher Body plants, was claimed to be necessary in order to prevent the Fisher 
brothers from holding up GM.
1 However, it is more likely that the main purpose 
of the merger was to integrate the Fisher brothers into the organizational 
structure created by Sloan. He pointed out that the increasing complexity of car 
design made it more difficult to ascertain the merits of successes and the 
responsibilities for failures, such as those involved in the production of the 
copper-cooled car. A turning point came when manufacturers decided to move 
from the production of open–body cars to closed-body ones. The latter made the 
distribution of the car’s weight extremely important for its stability, and it 
required an integrated project and full cooperation among all the research and 
production units.
 2 
With closed-body cars becoming the standard in the mid-1920s, any 
mistake, or any incompatibility among the views of the different departments, 
would have had much more dramatic consequences.  According to Sloan, the 
                                                 
1 The extra power to be gained with acquisition of Fisher Body’s physical capital could not be an 
important reason for the takeover. At the time of the acquisition, GM already owned 60 per cent of 
Fisher Body, and it was quite unlikely that any hold up could derive from a lack of control over 
physical capital.
 
2 According to Sloan, even before the advent of the closed body, there was, of course a "certain 
relationship between the various parts  that was adhered to by almost every car maker for many 
years. The radiator, for example, had to be in line with the front axle, a relationship which was 
responsible for the height of the cars of the period. Inevitably, these fixed relationships between the 
axles and the body of the old car meant that the car had to be high. However, this did not matter 
much during the period when the industry principally was building open cars - that is, until the mid-
twenties." (Sloan, 1963 p. 289). 
 
                                                                    3 
switch to closed-body cars entailed that the managers, who were responsible for 
the production of the body of the car (the Fisher brothers), should be brought 
under the same organizational umbrella. Although GM already had control of 
Fisher Body (it owned 60 per cent of the company’s shares), a merger was 
necessary to achieve the integration of activities required by the innovation and 
production processes of the closed-body era.
3  
 
 "There were operating economies to be gained by co-ordinating body and 
chassis assemblies, and with the closed body becoming dominant in the 
industry, it seemed sensible to bring the body operation entirely under the 
General Motors Roof. And it was felt desirable also to bring the Fisher brothers 
into closer relationship with our organization" (Sloan, 1963 p. 184).  
 
 The importance of a closer relationship with the Fisher brothers was then 
given even greater emphasis.
4 The increase of co-specificity due to the advent of 
closed bodies implied that specific high "second order" investments in the 
appropriate private ordering were necessary to obtain the smooth co-operation 
of the Fisher brothers with the other managers involved in construction of the 
new closed cars. In other words, the main purpose of the merger was to 
introduce a system of private governance where the fair exercise of power 
would decrease the risks faced by all the agents investing in co-specific human 
capital and produce an integrated product (such that individuals’ production 
failures could not be easily evaluated by public courts or other agents external to 
the organization).    
                                                 
3 Thus, the extra power to be gained with acquisition of Fisher Body’s physical capital  could not be 
an important reason for the takeover. Not only did GM already own 60 per cent of the physical 
capital of Fisher Body but the main purpose of the integration of Fisher Body into GM seems to have 
been a more complete "acquisition" of the human capital of the Fisher brothers. Pagano (2000) made 
this point unaware of the fact that Coase (2000), Freeland (2000) and Casamedus-Masanell and 
Spulber (2000) made a similar criticism of the standard account of the Fisher Body – GM 
relationship.  The standard holdup interpretation, used by Hart 1995, originated with Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian (1978) and was developed by Klein (1988). Klein (2000) defends his holdup 
interpretation.
 
4 In the 1926 Annual Report of General Motors Corporation, the section referring to what had just 
become the Fisher Body Division of GM states: "Of even greater importance is the bringing into 
General Motors operating organization in closer relationship, the Fisher brothers, through whose 
constructive ability, foresight and energy the institution bearing their name has been built up to the 
dominating position it now holds" (Dupont et al., 1927, p. 10).
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Since the conflicts concerned the copper-cooled engine, the development of 
a private ordering internal to GM had made remarkable progress. Sloan had 
perceived the main problem as being "one of conflict between the research 
organization and the producing divisions, and of a parallel conflict between the 
top management of the corporation and divisional management (1963, p. 94)", 
and he had decided that GM should be reorganized in two directions: 
decentralisation of operating responsibilities to the peripheral units, and 
centralisation of major policy formation to an Executive Committee. According 
to Sloan, the Executive Committee, "which views the corporation as a whole 
and at the same time is closely familiar with operating problems, has a 
somewhat judicial function" (Sloan, 1963 p. 458).  Before Sloan's re-
organization of GM, exercise of this judicial function had not been possible. The 
Executive Committee was composed of division managers, and there were no 
headquarters acting as intermediary between, and coordinator of, the various 
divisions. The result was a great deal of horse-trading among division managers. 
Each manager was ready to approve other projects on condition that he could 
get a favourable vote on his own project (Chandler, 1962 p.127, Bolton and 
Scharfstein 1998, p. 103.). Under the organization introduced by Sloan, which 
would subsequently become the system most commonly used by large firms, the 
acquisition of other firms like Fisher Body did not cause a sharp increase in 
internal rent-seeking activities (Breton, Wintrobe 1982) or, to use Milgrom and 
Roberts’s (1990) expression, an increased expenditure in influence costs
5.  
The efficiency gains consequent on the acquisition of Fisher Brothers can 
be seen from two different but complementary perspectives. On the one hand, 
the acquisition involved the centralization of some market transactions within a 
larger firm. On the other hand, any controversy arising from the deal between 
GM and Fisher Body was decentralized from the jurisdiction of public courts to 
the "judiciary powers" of the GM executive committee.  
                                                 
5 However, in the case of the Fisher division of GM, this influence costs were far from zero. The 
integration of the brother in the organizational structure of GM was a very slow process. The six 
Fisher brothers could distribute themselves among top management and the management of 
divisions. In this way, in the period 1926 to 1934, they retained control of the Fisher Body division 
and a monopoly on most of the knowledge concerning the production of the bodies of the cars. It is 
not surprising that, according to Freeland (2000), in 1934 they could still “holdup” GM obtaining 
very high compensation for staying at GM.                                                                     5 
The first perspective, which will be examined in the next section, can be 
related to the Coasian notion that the firm should be viewed as a centralization 
of market transactions. The second perspective, which will be examined in 
section 3, can be related to a view first advanced by Lon Fuller (1969) and 
which considers the firm as one of the possible ways to decentralize a the public 
ordering by setting up a private ordering like the one that Alfred Sloan 
introduced at GM.  
The remaining sections will try to integrate these two views by relying on 
Guido Calabresi's insight that courts manage “ex-post” transactions for which 
ex-ante contracts have been impossible or too costly. I shall argue that 
Calabresi’s cathedral is the ideal setting for a marriage between Coase and 
Fuller. Under its hallowed roof, the Coasian internalization of transactions and 
Fuller’s decentralization of the judicial function can be fruitfully integrated into 
a single framework yielding a better understanding of the evolution of large 
enterprises like GM. By virtue of this marriage, Fuller and Coase can deliver a 
rationale for the existence and size of the firm. In my view, their contributions, 
based on joint liabilities and unified ex-post exercise of power, offer a more 
useful framework for an understanding of corporate governance than the New 
Property Rights approach which relies only on unified ownership and ex-ante 
bargaining.    
 
 
2. Coase’s centralization of transactions. 
 
 Coase's 1960 article on the nature of social cost has become famous for the 
so-called "Coase theorem" on externalities. However, Coase's world is the 
opposite of the world of Coase's theorem that relies on zero transaction costs. 
Indeed, later, in the same article Coase re-states the consequences of the 
assumption of positive transaction costs. He reiterates the point already made in 
his famous article of 1937 that the firm represents “an alternative form of 
economic organization which could achieve the same result at less cost that 
would be incurred by using the market would enable the value of production to                                                                    6 
be raised”.
6 The firm is an organisation, alternative to both the market and the 
state, which enables the "internalisation" of (former) externalities.   
As Coase pointed out in his 1937 article, the relevant comparison is that 
between the administrative costs of organising a transaction within a firm and 
the costs of market transactions. He maintained that the former are likely to be 
lower than the latter whenever the "contracts are peculiarly difficult to draw up 
and an attempt to describe what the parties have agreed to do or not to do 
.....would necessitate a lengthy and highly involved document.... ". The 
allocation of resources within the firm is not governed by the price mechanism 
which characterizes a market economy. In a market economy "the direction of 
resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism" (p. 34) and "the 
allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the 
price mechanism" (p. 35). If in a market economy the price of factor A becomes 
higher in X than in Y, then A moves from Y to X until the prices of X and Y 
become equal. By contrast, within a firm " if a workman moves from department 
Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but 
because he is ordered to do so".  Coase defines firms as islands of central 
planning or, quoting D. Robertson (1928), as "islands of conscious power" 
existing in "the ocean of unconscious cooperation defining the market economy, 
and his question concerning the existence of the firm is rephrased in the 
following way:  
"But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be 
done by the price mechanism, why is such co-ordination necessary? Why are 
there these islands of conscious power?" 
Coase answers that the explanation of the existence of firms is that the use 
of the price mechanism is costly and the allocation system used within the firm 
may be relatively cheaper. Discovering the relevant prices, and negotiating and 
enforcing contracts, are all costly activities required by the use of the price 
mechanism. They can be greatly reduced if firm-type co-ordination replaces the 
                                                 
6 As I explained many years ago the firm represents such an alternative to organising market 
transactions" (Coase 1960, p. 115). Coase emphasises how "unified" private ownership? of a factor 
of production allows the rearrangement of production to take place without bargains among the 
owners of the factors of production. He considers how a "landowner who has control of a large tract 
of land may devote his land to various uses, taking into account the effect that the interrelations of 
the various activities will have on the net return of land, thus rendering unnecessary bargains 
between those undertaking the various activities" (Coase 1960 p. 116).
                                                                    7 
market system. But if firm-type co-ordination implies such a considerable 
saving of market transaction costs, why does the economy not become a single-
firm economy or, in other words, the centrally planned economy advocated by 
Marx?
7 Or, to reverse the question, why do markets exist? 
Coase’s answer to this “reversed question” is based on the idea that as firms 
expand, they are faced by increasing organizational costs. According to Coase, 
there are decreasing returns to management or to the entrepreneur’s function. As 
the size of the organization increases, the entrepreneur is more likely "to place 
the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to 
make the best use of resources" and smaller firms can compete him out of the 
market. "Naturally a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an 
extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out 
the transaction in the open market or to the costs of organizing by another 
entrepreneur." (Coase 1937, p. 43). In a competitive system the expansion of 
the firm will halt at this point, which is characterized by the fact that 
organizational costs are minimized. The central planning occurring within the 
firm and the market activities existing outside it will therefore be combined in 
the optimal way. "In a competitive system, there is an "optimum" amount of 
planning" (Coase 1937, p. 37). 
In Coase' s view, the optimal mixture of firm-type and market-type 
organization achieved by a competitive system will change over time because 
technological innovation is likely to alter the relative costs of these two ways of 
organizing economic activity. An increase (decrease) in the size of the firm will 
occur if a new invention makes firm-type organization cheaper (more 
expensive) than market-type organization. "For instance, if the telephone 
reduces the costs of using the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of 
organizing, then it will have the effect of reducing the size of the firm" (Coase 
1937 p. 46). An optimization problem is continuously solved by the competitive 
system. The optimal mixture of planning and markets  is recalculated and 
implemented whenever the technological data change. 
Yet even this efficiency bias in favour of competitive markets is overcome 
in the 1960 article. After all, competition is only one of the many costly 
                                                 
7 On the relation between Marx and NIE see Pagano (2007).                                                                    8 
institutions whereby human activities can be coordinated; and, as Calabresi has 
often pointed out, it cannot offer a "super-market" in which it competes with the 
other institutions.  
"But the firm”, Coase observes, “is not the only possible answer to this 
problem", for "an alternative solution is direct governmental regulation" (Coase 
1960 p. 116). Unlike a firm, government intervention is not subject to 
competition. Moreover, unlike a firm, the government can conscript and seize 
property, and it can deploy the police and other law enforcement agencies. 
However, Coase maintains that the government "is, in a sense, a super-firm (but 
of a special kind) since it is able to influence the use of factors of production by 
administrative decisions" (p. 116). In some cases, "the government has powers 
which might enable it to get things done at a lower cost than could a private 
organization....". However, even aside from governmental mistakes, "the 
governmental administrative machine is not itself costless" and it "can, in fact, 
on occasion be extremely costly". 
Thus, the first part of his 1960 article (where the conditions of the so-called 
"Coase theorem" would be satisfied) is only instrumental to moving towards a 
world where no organizational "free lunch" is possible and all types of 
transactions are costly. The problem is "one of choosing the appropriate social 
arrangement" in a world where "all solutions have costs". Moreover, given the 
nature of the problem, the existence of "externalities" does not entail that the 
costs of setting up a "social arrangement" to deal with these interactions will 
always outweigh the benefits. Thus, each institution, such as market contracts, 
firms, judiciary and the state, covers only a part of individual interactions; and, 
moreover, the overall mix of these "social arrangements" is necessarily 
incomplete. In a Coasian perspective, the centralization of market transactions 
within firms like GM should be viewed within this complex framework of 
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3.  Fuller's decentralization to private orderings. 
 
 
Coase's journey starts from a world of the costless decentralised markets of 
standard economic theory where a complete institution (complete markets) rules 
all human interactions. From this imaginary world, Coase sails towards 
understanding of the real-life complex world characterised by diverse and 
incomplete institutional orderings. While Coase proposes this fascinating 
voyage in the Realm of Economics, Lon Fuller makes a related  journey in the 
Realm of Law, starting from a location that seems located at the antipodes of 
Coase’s point of departure: a world of complete, consistent, and centralized 
public ordering.   
According to Fuller (1958), the generality and reciprocity of commands 
defines the minimum moral contents for a legal system to be distinguished from 
a simple system of arbitrary commands. The basic concern of law-making is to 
subject human conduct to the governance of rules. Law-making is a purposive 
activity which may fail to a greater or lesser extent. Like any other purposive 
activity, law-making requires attention to be paid to certain practical precepts 
related to the ultimate purpose of the activity. According to Fuller (1969. p. 39), 
eight such precepts should be followed if the object of law-making is to be 
achieved: 
 
(i) there must be rules 
(ii) they must be prospective, not retrospective 
(iii) the rules must be published 
(iv) the rules must be intelligible 
(v) the rules must not be contradictory 
(vi) compliance with the rules must be possible 
(vii) the rules must not be constantly changing 
(viii) there must be congruence between the rules as declared and as applied 
by officials. 
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According to Fuller, these eight principles represent eight ways in which 
the enterprise of law-making may go astray. They indicate eight minimum 
conditions for the existence of anything that we would regard as law or a legal 
system. For example, a system where all the rules are kept secret, or where all 
the rules are retrospective, would not normally fit the definition of a legal 
system. Complete failure to comply with any one of the eight principles results 
in something that is not law at all. On the other hand, complete success is 
impossible to achieve for real-life human societies. When human societies 
aspire to subjecting human behaviour to the governance of rules, "the principle 
of marginal utility plays an increasing role in our decisions". In this case, 
"something like an economic calculation may become necessary when a conflict 
arises between the internal and the external morality of law" (Fuller 1969 p. 44).  
Costly resources have to be expended to achieve the objectives of law-making: 
given the limitations of our resources and capabilities, the achievement of one 
objective implies the sacrifice of others. According to Fuller, there are "trade-
offs" not only between law and other objectives but also among the different 
objectives of law. 
A conflict between the internal and external morality of law may easily 
arise. On the one hand the "internal morality of law" requires that the laws do 
not change too often: if they do, its rules cannot satisfactorily guide human 
behaviour (principle vii). On the other hand, "it is obvious that changes in 
circumstances, or changes in men's consciences, may demand changes in the 
substantive aims of law, and sometimes disturbingly frequent changes" (Fuller 
1969 p. 44).  
However, "antinomies may arise within the internal morality of law itself" 
because "the various desiderata which go to make up that morality may at times 
come into opposition with one another". For instance, consistency (principle v) 
and intelligibility of law (principle iv) are both important objectives of a legal 
system. However an "economic" trade-off between these two goals may well 
arise and "it may become necessary to pursue a middle course which involves 
some impairment of both desiderata" (Fuller 1969 p. 45). In this regard, Fuller 
refers to a conversation that he had with a former Minister of Justice of Poland, 
who told Fuller that "in the early days of the communist regime an earnest and 
sustained effort was made to draft the laws so clearly that they would be                                                                    11 
intelligible to the worker and to the peasant". However, an "economic" trade-off 
emerged. "This kind of clarity could be attained only at the cost of those 
systematic elements in a legal system that shape its rules into a coherent whole 
and render them capable of consistent application by the courts" (Fuller 1969 p. 
45). This made unavoidable some retreat whereby the "marginal utility" of both 
consistency and clarity were taken into account.  If law-making is the enterprise 
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, it may be carried out 
with varying degrees of success. Which means that the existence of a legal 
system is a matter of degree.  
A common ground between Coase and Fuller thus starts to emerge. In 
Coase, a system of markets cannot be taken for granted because costly resources 
are involved in the use of the market mechanism. According to Fuller, a system 
of complete rules of law cannot be taken for granted for similar reasons. 
According to Coase, the cost of using the market mechanism implies that 
institutions other than markets are used to coordinate human activities. 
Similarly, Fuller points out that more than one legal system may coexist: 
numerous public orderings (EEC, national states, regional and provincial 
governments) co-exist with even more numerous private orderings, such as 
unions, universities, churches and firms.   
The relatedness between Coase’s and Fuller’s theories becomes particularly 
clear when we consider the role that the firm – one of the possible private 
orderings – also plays in Fuller as an ideal destination for his journey. In a way 
similar to the state – the mythical King Rex considered by Fuller – also the 
employer may find it convenient to set up a legal system in miniature. However, 
when he tries to do so, like King Rex, he runs the same risks of failing to satisfy 
the eight principles that characterise a legal system.   
 The employer "must not only invest some effort and intelligence in the 
enterprise, but its very success limits its own freedom of action. If in distributing 
praise and censure, he habitually disregards his own rule, he may find his 
system of law disintegrating and without any open revolt, it may cease to 
produce for him what he thought to obtain from it." (Fuller 1969 p. 47-8) 
In other words, in order to reap some benefits from a private ordering, the 
employer not only has to sustain the relative "set-up" costs but must also incur 
the "rigidity costs" of submitting him/herself to the rules that s/he has created.                                                                    12 
The effort may, however, be worthwhile because the "public ordering" may be 
unable to provide the specific rules that may adequately regulate the principles 
of conduct that are appropriate to run that particular business.  
Sloan's separation between executive committee and the other divisions can 
be seen as a Fuller-type decentralization of the judicial function to a private 
ordering. Before Fisher Body’s transformation from an independent firm to a 
GM division, any disputes had to be adjudicated by public courts, which relied 
mainly on general rules and drew very little on inside information. The task was 
now decentralized to GM's executive committee, which had taken over the 





4. Marriage opportunities. 
 
Coase and Fuller reach the same conclusion that the internal structure of the 
firm may be rather important for the success of business activities. Their starting 
points seem to be located at opposite poles, however. The Coasian 
“centralization” argument is founded on the costs that are otherwise sustained 
by separate economic agents performing “decentralized” market transactions. If 
these costs were zero, one could not explain the existence of a costly institution 
like the firm. By contrast, the Fuller “decentralization” argument starts by 
considering the costs of a completely “centralized” public ordering. If the costs 
of running and using a complete public ordering were nil, there would be no 
possible explanation for the "set-up" and "rigidity" costs that are sustained to 
run that particular form of "private ordering" which defines the firm. 
In other words, in Coase and Fuller, the firm seems to arise from two 
contrasting processes: in Coase it does so from a "centralisation" of market 
transactions, in Fuller from a "decentralisation" of the public ordering. 
However, the two processes refer to opposite faces of the same coin. Many of 
the costs of performing market transactions happen to coincide with the costs of 
using a "pure" public ordering. When firms, unions, arbitrators and other forms 
of private orderings do not exist, the market transactions of agents can only be                                                                    13 
regulated and enforced by the public ordering. In this situation, the cost of 
defining and enforcing the rights of agents, their bargaining and their litigation 
costs, and many other costs besides, may be classified either as the costs of 
using the market mechanism or as the costs of using the public orderings. 
Alternatively, these costs can be classified under a single heading: they are the 
costs of using only "public markets"
8 or, in other words, markets that are not 
supported by the numerous "private orderings", like firms, that exist in all the 
modern real-life capitalist economies.  
 For both Coase and Fuller, market contracts are necessarily incomplete. 
Public markets are costly. Their incompleteness would be a necessary feature of 
an optimal world where these costs are an endogenous aspect of the economic 
analysis. In an optimal world, public markets should only exist when their 
benefit is greater than the benefits of private orderings. Moreover, even in an 
optimal world designed by some omniscient God, the mix of private and public 
orderings should not aspire to perfection and completeness: all institutions are 
costly and the benefit of regulating human interactions should always be 
compared to its costs. An omniscient God, knowing that humans have limited 
resources, will find it unreasonable to allocate an unlimited amount of resources 
to a perfect and complete structuring of human interactions. Alternative uses 
(for instance, food production and health services) may be more compelling at 
the margin. 
Summing up, a shared awareness of costs and of incompleteness engages 
both Coase and Fuller in a common journey from a world of decentralized 
markets and centralized public orders to centralized transactions and 
decentralized private orderings. In some circumstances the firm may emerge as 
a system of centralized transactions organized within a private decentralized 
legal ordering.  
 
Fig 1. The Coase-Fuller Engagement about here. 
                                                 
 8 The term "public markets" was suggested by the well-known concluding lines of Alchiam and 
Demsetz (1972, p. 795) who observed: 
 
"In contrast to markets and cities, which can be viewed as publicly or non owned market places, the 
firm can be considered a privately owned market; if so, we could consider the firm and the ordinary 
market as competing types of markets, competition between private proprietary markets and public 
or communal markets. Could it be that the market suffers from defects of communal property rights 
in organising and influencing uses of valuable resources?" .




9 Cathedral can provide the setting for a marriage between 
Coase’s and Fuller’s theories. Calabresi has greatly enriched the transaction cost 
approach and our understanding of the multiple legal orderings by which human 
behaviour can be subject to the observance of rules. In one famous article 
(Calabresi 1970) he clarified how liability rules can reduce transaction costs in 
the case of accidents and how courts can operate as ultimate ex-post price setters 
for transactions which have been forced upon the sellers. Moreover, his 
contribution
10 has shown us the complexity of the institutions dealing with non-
alienable resources.
11 Ordinary markets, liability rules and inalienable resources 
offer the foundations of a Cathedral that can be expanded to accommodate a 
fruitful analysis of other institutions. 
 
Fig. 2: Calabresi’s Fundamental Transformation about here. 
 
 
 In Calabresi’s framework some prices must be settled ex-post after some 
involuntary transactions have already taken place. In the typical case of 
accidents, it would be too costly to state prices before the accident took place 
and rely only on property rules or on transactions taking place in a framework of 
ex-ante complete contracts. In such a world, Calabresi suggests, liability rules 
become more advantageous than property rules. Liability rules emphasize the 
role of courts having the ultimate power to set the prices of transactions that 
have already taken place in a situation of incomplete contracts. Property rules 
have a clear advantage when it is possible to anticipate future events. In this 
case entitlements will be transferred only under conditions that have been ex-
ante agreed between buyers and sellers. By contrast, in many cases future 
interactions and events are impossible, or very costly, to forecast, and the entire 
                                                 
9 See Calabresi and Melamed (1972).
 
10 See Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978)
 
11 This greatly enriched the framework within which to study markets, firms, public and private 
orderings, and other institutions, and "carried Coase further" by clarifying the complex relation 
between efficiency and distributive choices (Calabresi 1991). 
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bargaining process has to take place ex-post under the supervision and ultimate 
price-setting authority of courts.  
In his celebrated work on accidents, Calabresi (1970) considered the 
different liability arrangements regulating the transfer of the entitlements 
between the culprit and the victim of an accident. In principle, in a world of zero 
transaction costs, property rules would be able to regulate an ex-ante exchange 
of entitlements in competitive markets. However, in the case of accidents, the 
costs of the ex-ante transactions among potential culprits and victims would be 
prohibitive. Such costs could only be saved by having transactions relate only to 
accidents which actually happen. However, after the occurrence of an accident, 
the transfer of entitlements has already taken place and the negotiation will 
necessarily happen in conditions of bilateral monopoly where competitive 
markets cannot help in setting prices and courts must assume this role.   
Calabresi’s analysis highlights a “fundamental transformation” in the nature of 
the possible contracting process: before accidents the contracts between 
potential victims and culprits can be agreed in a competitive framework; by 
contrast, after accidents occur, the relation is transformed into a bilateral 
monopoly.  
The Cathedral framework helps us to understand in which cases this role of 
public courts could be internalized within firms, as happened at GM after the 
copper-cooled engine problems arose. In this sense the Cathedral offers the ideal 
setting for a Fuller-Coase marriage whereby the firm arises as a system of 
unified liabilities (towards external agents) and as a conscious island of power 
(which must assign and adjudicate tasks and responsibilities among internal 
members sharing these liabilities).   
However, marriages should not be rushed, and alternative arrangements 
must first be considered. 
 An alternative arrangement has, indeed, been offered by the New Property 
Rights approach. This has sought to marry standard economic theory – suitably 
modified with ‘holes of incompleteness’ – with the Coasian approach. The 
result has been a theory that views the firm as a unified ownership of assets and 
predicts that the agents best able to invest in human capital will own its assets.                                                                    16 
In the New Property Rights approach,
12 third parties cannot verify the efforts or 
the results obtained from investing in human capital. It is therefore impossible to 
write a complete contract. In these circumstances each agent is exposed to the 
risk of non-cooperation by the other agents, and the first best result cannot be 
achieved because the public officials cannot impose penalties that eliminate the 
advantages of this type of behaviour. In this situation, the private ownership of 
physical capital can give the owners some advantages that would not arise in a 
situation of zero transaction costs (or of zero cost verification by the public 
ordering). Owners are entitled to do with their goods whatever is not explicitly 
forbidden by contracts, and their residual liberties may well include actions that 
expose other agents to the negative consequences of the exercise of those 
liberties. Moreover, when this possibility is not explicitly ruled out by 
contractual obligations, private property gives the owners the right to exclude 
the other agents from the use of physical capital (also in the case when their 
human capital investment is specific to those inputs). 
When contracts are incomplete, private property matters for human capital 
investments, and the ownership of physical capital becomes most valuable for 
those agents making the most substantial and specific investments in human 
capital. In the case of breakdown in cooperation, owners can at least count on 
the access to physical capital. Ownership increases bargaining power with 
respect to other agents and provides owners with a greater incentive to invest in 
human capital in comparison with the other individuals. Efficient allocations 
give ownership of assets to the agents best able to invest in specific human 
capital and the extent of ownership depends on the nature of the assets.  
In this framework, it is possible to make sense of a U-shaped cost curve, 
which, in spite of its intuitive appeal, is otherwise hard to justify in standard 
neoclassical theory. The effect on costs of increasing the concentration of 
ownership is U-shaped because under ex-ante contractual incompleteness, 
complementary assets should be owned jointly but independent assets should be 
owned separately. 
The fact that complementary assets should be under common ownership 
follows directly from the definition itself of complementarity. In the New 
                                                 
12 See Hart 1995.
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Property Rights approach, two assets are defined to be (strictly) complementary 
if they are unproductive unless they are used together. In other words, access to 
both sets of (complementary) assets is the conditio sine qua non for any agent to 
benefit from increases in its marginal productivity. Starting from a situation of 
separate ownership, any form of integration enhances efficiency because 
transferring ownership rights over one of the assets to either party increases the 
latter’s marginal returns without decreasing the returns to the party excluded 
from ownership. This is because control of one of the assets alone has no effect 
on an agent’s marginal productivity in the absence of an agreement with the 
agent controlling the complementary asset. Conversely, attributing ownership 
rights to different agents negatively affects actors’ incentives since it increases 
the number of possible hold-ups. An analogous line of reasoning suggests that 
attribution of ownership rights over complementary assets to the same right-
holder may have a positive impact on efficiency also because, under common 
ownership, outside agents have to negotiate with only one agent rather than two 
in order to use the assets. 
By contrast, it is possible to show that independent assets should be owned 
separately. Here again the result follows from the definition itself of 
"independence". Assets are independent when their concentration in the hands 
of one individual decreases the incentive to invest of one of the individuals 
deprived of the asset without increasing the incentive to invest of the individual 
acquiring it. Thus, assets that are independent should be owned separately and 
the decentralization of ownership can be a means to provide greater incentives 
to invest in human capital.   
The complementarity-independence argument gives a rationale for the U-
shaped curve: concentrating ownership decreases costs until one acquires 
complementary assets but increases them when one starts acquiring independent 
assets. The argument explains how a change in technology, such as the switch 
from the production of open-body cars to closed-body ones would increase the 
complementarity of production plants and stimulate a GM - Fisher Body type 
merger 
13. 
                                                 
13 Hart (1995, p. 7) observes that "for a long time Fisher Body and GM were separate firms linked 
by a long-term contract. However, in the 1920s GM's demand for car bodies increased substantially. 
After Fisher Body refused to revise the formula for determining price, GM bought Fisher out".
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(Fig. 3: the New Property Rights fictitious transformation, about here) 
 
In the New Property Rights approach, similarly to the world of Calabresi 
accidents, there are two periods; and similarly to the Cathedral liability case, 
agents cannot write complete contracts in the first period. In both models the 
first period is characterised by potential conditions of perfect competition and 
the second period by conditions of bilateral monopoly. However, whereas in the 
Cathedral setting some actions can occur in the competitive phase (contracts and 
accidents) and some others in the bilateral monopoly phase (bargaining by the 
agents and price setting by courts), in the New Property Rights approach all the 
action is squeezed into the first period (or in other words, into the competitive 
phase). This miraculous squeeze is obtained by making very special 
assumptions. In the competitive initial period the agents perfectly forecast  what 
will happen in the subsequent situation of bilateral monopoly, and they take all 
decisions (including the level of under-investment in human capital and the 
exchanges of non-human capital) at the outset of their relation. Since the agents 
perfectly anticipate all the decisions to be taken in the bilateral monopoly stage, 
no decision is really taken in this period. Thus the second period is a fictitious 
stage whose life can be entirely run ex-ante only in the minds of the super-
rational individuals.  
The ex-post activity of the courts, which plays such an important role in the 
Cathedral, is useless in the New Property Rights framework because no 
unanticipated activity takes place at this later stage. It is also economically 
unfeasible because the model has implicitly ruled out all verification activities 
by dividing human actions into two extreme categories: those involving zero 
verification costs (exchange of machines) and those whose verification by third 
parties would require infinite verification costs (investment in human capital). 
On the one hand, the contracts concerning physical assets are complete, and 
they are enforced at zero costs. On the other hand, the contracts concerning 
human capital investments are impossible because, while investments are 
observable for the contracting parties, third parties cannot verify them. As in a 
“Swiss cheese”, we observe smooth surfaces of complete contracts and perfectly 
carved holes of contractual incompleteness   (Pagano 2000).                                                                    19 
The "Swiss cheese assumption" implies that third party verification is either 
costless or infinitely costly, and it implicitly rules out the endogenous search of 
a reasonable degree of (in)completeness that could be achieved by the public 
ordering by means of investments in contract verification capabilities. In this 
way, it rules out Calabresi’s liability rule and the price-setting role of public 
courts in ex-post conditions of bilateral monopoly.  
Similarly in this framework, more investments by private agents (like Alfred 
Sloan) cannot increase the capacity to devise better working rules and to verify 
the behaviour of other agents more efficiently. In other words, in the New 
Property Rights approach, the firm cannot be explained as a private ordering 
where some agents make "second order" specific investments to manage some 
specific relations (or, in other words, develop specific organizational capital). 
The institutions of corporate governance, and all the investments made to 
overcome the problems of contract incompleteness, do not make any sense 
within the New Property Rights approach. The Coasian firm conceived as an 
island of power cannot exist because no power is ex-post exercised outside the 
competitive ex-ante setting. For the Coasian theory of the firm, the marriage 
with a neoclassical competitive setting with incomplete markets turns out to be 
unsatisfactory. It may generate an interesting theory of second-best ownership 
but cannot deliver a theory of the firm. If such a marriage has already taken 
place, an amicable divorce is necessary. A new marriage between Ronald Coase 
and Lon Fuller must, finally, be arranged in the Cathedral. 
 
 
5. Marriage in the Cathedral. 
 
 The New Property Rights approach provides a bad marriage arrangement 
for the Coasian theory because, unlike Calabresi’s liability analysis, its 
promised transformations are fictitious and misleading. The claim that future 
bilateral monopoly is included in the analysis turns out to be false. The fiction of 
hyper-rational agents, perfectly forecasting the future situation of bilateral 
monopoly, implies that no real fundamental transformation takes place. Good 
marriages require authentic transformations from pre-marriage competitive 
conditions to post-marriage successful monopolies.                                                                      20 
Two witnesses are required in the Cathedral for a marriage to be valid. One 
has already been introduced in the person of Guido Calabresi. He is best able to 
tell us about situations in which fundamental transformations from competition 
to bilateral monopoly are the unintended results of accidents among unknown 
agents, and the ex-post action of public courts avoids serious ex-post problems. 
The other best man must necessarily be Oliver Williamson. He is best person to  
certify the real existence of fundamental transformations from competition to 
bilateral monopoly which, unlike the Calabresi’s accidents cases are the 
intended results of agents making specific investments. In this framework, all 
sorts of private orderings (including marriages) are constructed to avoid serious 
ex-ante problems. 
 











Fig 4 shows Williamson’s (1985) "fundamental transformation" due to 
asset specificity. Before specific investments are made, the potential investors 
are agents acting in a competitive framework. By contrast, after the specific 
investments have taken place, the agents are engaged in a bilateral monopoly 
relationship where each agent can damage the other and where both agents are 
likely to be jointly liable for their efforts. In Williamson, too, this fundamental 
transformation requires some form of third-party governance.   
Comparing figures 2 and 4 reveals an analogy between the fundamental 
transformations of Guido Calabresi and Oliver Williamson.  Unlike the case of 
figure 3 schematizing the New Property Rights approach, figures 2 and 4 bear                                                                    21 
witness to real-life transitions both moving from competitive conditions to 
bilateral monopoly, which become two stages of the same process.  
Specific investments play a well-known role in Williamson’s fundamental 
transformation. Agents become aware that specific investments entail the 
impossibility of re-allocating the investments made in the relationship to its 
outside, and when these types of investments are relevant and/or frequent, they 
try to centralize transactions into the hands of reliable private orderings. 
Even if Calabresi’s theory is not usually phrased in this way, it can be re-
cast in terms of specific (dis-)investment. Also the specific dis-investment 
caused by accidents cannot be re-allocated in other accidents, and the agents are 
confronted by a typical bilateral monopoly related to asset-specificity.  
Car accidents are typical cases in which specific (dis)investments are not 
repeated with the same partners. It is, indeed, very unlikely that one will be 
involved in frequent car accidents with the same person. However, the type of 
accidents that occurred at GM were frequent and with well-known partners. In 
this case, specific (dis)investments mean that it may become convenient to 
internalize courts and change to a system of joint liabilities towards outsiders. 
More in detail, the two cases are different for the following reasons:  
In the first place, in cases like car accidents, the two agents are unlikely to 
have ever personally met in competitive markets with any awareness of their 
future roles. Thus, they are not able to agree on any contractual clause under 
competitive conditions that may constrain the future development of the relation 
under conditions of bilateral monopoly. One does not choose the victim or the 
culprit of a car accident. By contrast, one is likely to choose the persons and a 
(incomplete) contractual framework within which one can make specific (dis-
)investments occurring with predictable partners. Moreover, unlike the car 
accident case, choices made under competitive conditions may also include the 
choice of the third party who will have judicial power in the future situation of 
bilateral monopoly. 
In the second place, not only the identities but also the duration is different 
in the two cases. In cases like car accidents, the ex-post relation lasts only for 
the time required to redress the damage, and there are not the gains from 
continued cooperation which characterize co-specific investments. By contrast, 
in other cases of specific (dis)investments, while the relation develops, it is                                                                    22 
worthwhile investing in a “second order” specific structure that governs 
relations with increasing insight.  
Finally, lasting relations with predictable partners induce the a-priori supply 
of private governance structures. In an “ex-ante” competitive market, the parties 
can choose the individuals who make the “second order specific investments” in 
the governance of their relation. Moreover, also the opposite possibility is open 
in the case of frequent and voluntary specific investments: the persons who 
make second-order specific investments can set up governance structures that 
favour the first-order specific investments of the individuals joining them. 
Richard Posner (1981 and 1983) has maintained that public judges maximize the 
total wealth of the agents. While his theory is subject to several limitations and 
counter-tendencies in the public domain, it can find a partial and, somehow, 
more convincing application in the case of the private judges making second-
order specific investments. Private judges may offer governance structures 
where individuals are able to make specific investments without fear of 
expropriation. In this case, some, and only “ex-ante”, competition may induce 
private judges – or, in other words, firms’ top managers – to look for wealth-
maximizing solutions. Even if internal rent seeking, information asymmetries 
and incentive misalignments set serious limitations on this tendency, private 
governance structures are also sensitive to this competitive pressure. 
In Cathedrals, time cannot be squeezed into the present. Past, Present and 
Future all have equal dignity, and fundamental transformations must be taken 
seriously. Transitions from one fundamental transformation to the other must be 
taken even more seriously: they are the essence of the Fuller-Coase marriage. 
   
 
 





Unlike the New Property Rights approach, the Coase-Fuller marriage 
delivers a theory of the firm, and not simply a theory of the optimal allocation of                                                                    23 
ownership. The restrictive assumption that verification costs are either zero or 
infinite is also removed, and the relative performance of the investments in 
verification of public and private orderings can be fruitfully compared.  The 
firm emerges when a system of dispersed liabilities and public courts mutates 
into a system of joint liabilities and unified power where management is able to 
exercise an internal judicial function. 
 GM as a whole was liable to its customers for providing an overheating 
engine. Alfred Sloan was well aware of the complications of dividing the 
responsibilities between Mr. Kettering and the production engineers. Moreover, 
after the introduction of the closed body, it became impossible to distinguish 
between the effects of the engine and the body shape on the car’s road-holding. 
Settling disputes judicially became extremely costly because courts could not 
accumulate as much expertise as the top management of a unified firm in order 
to assess the responsibilities of the engine and closed-body production 
departments. A system of joint liability of GM and Fisher Body became 
necessary, and an internal system of governance became important to stimulate 
the co-specific investments.  
Two different orderings were devised for the two different types of 
accident. In case of car accidents possibly due to bad road-holding, the public 
courts still had the ultimate judicial power to ascertain the responsibilities of the 
new unified governance structures with respect to GM’s customers. However, in 
order to assess the responsibility of a particular production department, it was 
now up to top management to settle disputes between the former GM and Fisher 
Body production units. As long as this system of unified and internally 
adjudicated liabilities was able to produce better results than market interfaces 
and public courts, the firm could expand, possibly well beyond the limits that 
the advantages of common ownership of productive assets would have allowed.  
Joint liability and the internal adjudication of responsibilities are the 
essence of the firm and the foundations of corporate governance: they involve a 
centralization of transactions as well as a decentralization of some powers of a 
public ordering to private orderings amid recognition that business organizations 
are legal persons.  
Legal personality is a crucial feature that most modern firms have taken 
from public orderings. When an institution is a legal person, it has an existence                                                                    24 
independent of its members. Therefore its rights and obligations do not 
terminate with the death of its human founders and members; it can sue and be 
sued in tribunals with respect to contracts as well to crimes, even in relation to 
its members; and it can own property in its own name. 
The legal personality of an organization entails the limited liability of the 
shareholders and of the agents acting on their behalf. In other words, it implies 
the organization’s full and joint liability for its actions, separating the 
responsibilities of the organization from those of its members. Individuals 
cannot be made personally liable for the debts of an organization, which, 
because of the joint stock principle, can be managed as a single unit by the 
individuals delegated to run it.
14 
It has been a great achievement of modern nations to separate the legal 
personality of the state from its rulers. Only when the state became liable for its 
obligations independently from its mortal representatives did a legal public 
ordering become possible.  Only later were churches, universities, unions and 
firms also granted incorporation like the state. By the time Sloan was planning 
the merger with the Fisher brothers, firms could also freely choose to become 
legal persons and set up joint liabilities, with the internal attribution of 
responsibilities. At GM, the Coasian process of centralization of market 
transactions could go together with a Fullerian process of integration of 
liabilities in a sophisticated private ordering.  Marrying in the Cathedral is not 
only about law and economics; it also involves two real-life historical processes. 
It involves opening up to a novel analysis of the corporation where the legal  
indipendence of the corporation (and the independence of its board) from the 
shareholder allows each shareholder to lock-in large specific investments (some 
times, unfortunately, specific disinvestments!) without being afraid of being 
deprived of co-specific capital (as it could happen under a partnership 
arrangement). As Lynne Stout (2005) has convincingly argued, the legal 
independent personality of the corporation should be associated to a third-party 
fair judicial role of its managers. As long as the managers of the do not favour a 
particular constituency (for instance its shareholders or, even worse, a group of 
shareholders), the corporation does not only allow the lock-in of specific 
                                                 
14 See Cerri 2007. Pacces (2007, chap 1) gives a complete analysis of all the conditions which 
define the modern corporation. 
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physical capital but also the specific investments in human capital of the other 
stakeholders. The managers of corporate legal person should not simply behave 
as Coasian centralizers of market transactions but also as dispersed pieces of the 
body of the Sovereign






The paper has advanced the view that the main reason for the existence of 
the firm is the unification and the internalization of liabilities.  Corporate 
governance can be viewed as a centralization of market transactions and as a 
decentralization of a public ordering which enables the management of joint 
liabilities and the internal adjudication of responsibilities.  Coase's and Fuller's 
contributions to the theory of the firm can be married within the architecture of 
Calabresi's Cathedral. Because of specific Willamsonian (dis)investments, 
fundamental transformations from competition to bilateral monopoly take place 
either in the public or the private sphere. Marrying Coase and Fuller in the 
Cathedral can deliver an analysis of corporate governance founded on the 
comparative analysis of alternative forms of governance. The imaginary journey 
from decentralized transactions and centralized public ordering to centralized 
transactions and decentralized private orderings could continue towards a better 
understanding of the various public and private governance systems. In 
particular, it can help us to analyze those institutions, like the corporation, which 
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